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CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: CONFINING 
JUVENILES WITH ADULTS AFTER GRAHAM AND MILLER 
ABSTRACT 
Thousands of juveniles are currently confined with adults in detention and 
correctional facilities throughout the United States. Juveniles confined in adult 
facilities face grave dangers to their safety and well-being, including 
significantly higher rates of physical assault, sexual abuse, and suicide than 
their counterparts in juvenile facilities. These dangers and other conditions of 
juvenile confinement with adults give rise to concerns of constitutional 
dimension. In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Supreme 
Court has created categorical rules prohibiting the imposition of certain 
punishments on entire categories of offenders as cruel and unusual 
punishment. The Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida, in which it held 
that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole violates the 
Eighth Amendment when applied to juveniles convicted of nonhomicide 
offenses, and its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, in which it held that 
mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes violate the Eighth 
Amendment when applied to juveniles, open the door to challenge the 
constitutionality of the confinement of juveniles with adults. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Standing at 5'2" and weighing 125 pounds, Rodney Hulin entered a Texas 
state prison at the age of 16 after being convicted of second-degree arson.1 
Rodney had set a neighborhood dumpster on fire, which resulted in less than 
$500 worth of property damage.2 Almost immediately after entering prison, 
Rodney was raped by another prisoner.3 Although he begged to be moved out 
of the general population, Rodney was returned to the same unit after receiving 
medical treatment for the first rape.4 As he continued to be beaten, raped, and 
forced to perform oral sex on other prisoners, he repeatedly requested transfer 
out of the general population.5 On one occasion, he wrote a prison official: 
“I’m afraid to go to sleep, to shower or just about anything else. I am afraid 
that when I am doing these things, I might die at any time. Please, sir, help 
me.”6 After seventy-five days in prison, Rodney hanged himself in his cell.7 
Throughout the United States, thousands of juveniles8 are confined with 
adults in adult facilities, which include jails9 and prisons,10 rather than in 
juvenile facilities, which have been designed and designated for juveniles.11 
 
 1 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, REPORT 69 (2009), available at http://nprec.us/files/pdfs/ 
NPREC_FinalReport.PDF. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. (quoting Testimony of Linda Bruntmeyer, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (July 31, 2002), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=4f1e0899533f7680e78d03281fe329f3&wit_id=4f
1e0899533f7680e78d03281fe329f3-2-1) (internal quotation marks omitted). Prison officials finally moved 
Rodney into a segregated unit, and his suicide occurred after this transfer. Id. 
 8 Although states define the legal term “juvenile” differently, for purposes of this Comment, a juvenile 
is any individual under the age of eighteen. 
 9 The term “jail” refers to a correctional facility that primarily holds “pretrial detainees and/or prisoners 
sentenced to a term of one year or less.” AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON THE 
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS standard 23-1.0(i), at 1 (2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/ 
midyear2010/102i.pdf. A correctional facility is “any place of adult criminal detention . . . operated by or on 
behalf of a correctional or law enforcement agency.” Id. standard 23-1.0(e). “The term ‘correctional facility’ 
does not include a facility that serves solely as . . . a juvenile detention facility, or a juvenile correctional 
facility.” Id. 
 10 The term “prison” refers to a correctional facility that primarily holds prisoners who have been 
sentenced to at least a one-year term of incarceration. Id. standard 23-1.0(j). 
 11 See TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES 
9 tbl.6 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim09st.pdf; HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009–STATISTICAL TABLES 24 tbl.21 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf. Juveniles generally enter adult facilities as a result of 
being charged and prosecuted in adult criminal court, rather than in the juvenile justice system. JAMES AUSTIN 
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Rodney’s experiences highlight some of the dangers faced by juveniles 
confined with adults. Juveniles, who continue to develop cognitively, 
emotionally, and physically, are especially harmed by confinement with 
adults.12 Juveniles confined in adult facilities, which are not designed to meet 
the special needs of juveniles and are generally staffed by individuals who 
have not been trained to work with juvenile populations, have less access to 
rehabilitative programming and educational services than their counterparts 
confined in juvenile facilities.13 
Adult inmates pose some of the greatest risks to juveniles held in adult 
facilities. In an adult facility, a juvenile faces a far greater risk of harm, 
including physical and sexual assault, than a juvenile housed in a juvenile 
facility.14 While adult facilities in some states separate juveniles from adult 
inmates, many do not.15 Children as young as thirteen may be held alongside 
adult offenders.16 This Comment argues that confining children under the age 
of eighteen with adults violates the Eighth Amendment17 to the United States 
Constitution.18 
 
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 182503, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT, at ix (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf. Juveniles may be 
transferred from juvenile court to criminal court through a waiver procedure, or states may set the age of the 
criminal court’s original jurisdiction to be under eighteen. Id. at 3. 
 12 See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 142–43. 
 13 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 66–67; see also Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of 
Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL 
COURT 227, 256 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (noting that correctional officers “appeared 
to be focused exclusively on enforcing rules, maximizing surveillance, and demonstrating their power” and 
that, “[b]ecause the prisons were primarily custodial facilities, most [inmates] were not engaged in programs 
aimed at their personal or social development”). 
 14 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–8. 
 15 Id. at xi, 45. 
 16 Id. at 41. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”). Although the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments only 
applies following an individual’s conviction, the majority of federal circuits use an Eighth Amendment 
framework to assess whether conditions of pretrial confinement violate the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments. See infra Part III.A. 
 18 To file a suit against a prison official alleging an Eighth Amendment violation, an individual 
incarcerated in a state facility may bring a civil action for deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 
mechanism by which the majority of constitutional claims are brought against state prison officials. Katherine 
Robb, What We Don’t Know Might Hurt Us: Subjective Knowledge and the Eighth Amendment’s Deliberate 
Indifference Standard for Sexual Abuse in Prisons, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 705, 707 n.19 (2010). 
Specific issues relating to § 1983, including standing, immunity, and the impact of the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), are beyond the scope of this Comment. An individual 
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In one strand of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
has established categorical rules banning certain sentencing practices for 
particular offenders or offenses.19 Prior to its decision in Graham v. Florida, 
the Court had only established categorical rules prohibiting the imposition of 
the death penalty on either certain offenders20 or for certain offenses.21 In these 
decisions, the Court analyzed whether a national consensus existed against 
applying the death penalty to the categories of offenders or offenses under 
consideration and then exercised independent judicial discretion to assess 
whether the death penalty was cruel and unusual in each circumstance.22 In 
Graham, the Court expanded its jurisprudence when it applied this analytical 
framework to hold a noncapital punishment, life in prison without the 
possibility of parole, unconstitutional as applied to juveniles convicted of 
nonhomicide offenses.23 In 2012, the Court relied upon this line of cases 
involving juveniles in its decision in Miller v. Alabama, in which it held that 
mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes as applied to juveniles 
violate the Eighth Amendment.24 The Court’s decision in Graham and its 
emphasis on juveniles’ distinctive characteristics and diminished culpability in 
Roper v. Simmons, Graham, and Miller open the door to challenge other 
noncapital punishments and conditions of confinement applied to juveniles, 
including confinement with adults. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the grave dangers arising from the 
confinement of juveniles with adults, including the significant risk of physical 
and sexual assault, high rates of suicide, and lack of access to critical services. 
Part II examines the developmental and legally recognized differences between 
juveniles and adults. Part III explores the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence with a focus on the two-part analytical framework adopted by 
 
incarcerated in a federal prison may bring a Bivens suit per Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). Specific issues related to a Bivens suit are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 19 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 20 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile defendants); 
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants). 
 21 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446–47 (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on defendants 
convicted of nonhomicide offenses). 
 22 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“The beginning point [of the Eighth Amendment analysis] is a 
review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question . . . . We then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent judgment, 
whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment . . . .”). 
 23 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. 
 24 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
1450 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1445 
the Court in its establishment of categorical rules prohibiting the imposition of 
certain punishments on entire categories of offenders or offenses. Part IV 
argues that incarcerating juveniles in adult detention and correctional facilities 
where they come in contact with adult offenders constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and details recommendations for 
remedying this constitutional violation. 
I. THE CONFINEMENT OF JUVENILES WITH ADULTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Part examines the grave dangers faced by thousands of juveniles who 
are confined with adults in jails and prisons in the United States each year. 
Section A outlines the increased risks and harm that juveniles face when 
confined in adult facilities, rather than juvenile facilities. Section B 
demonstrates that, despite the continued detention and incarceration of 
thousands of juveniles in adult facilities each day, a national consensus against 
confining juveniles with adults is forming. 
A. The Dangers of Confining Juveniles with Adults 
Juveniles confined in jails and prisons face serious threats to their health 
and well-being. Juveniles in adult facilities face a high risk of physical and 
sexual abuse from guards and other inmates, and this abuse may have 
devastating and long-term consequences for the victimized juvenile.25 
Juveniles confined in adult facilities also have dramatically higher rates of 
suicide than do their counterparts housed in juvenile facilities.26 While 
confined in adult facilities, juveniles lack access to services critical to their 
continued development and are particularly vulnerable to criminal 
socialization.27 
Juveniles face significantly higher rates of physical and sexual abuse in 
adult facilities than do adult inmates in the same facilities or juveniles housed 
in juvenile facilities.28 This abuse often begins immediately, within the first 
 
 25 See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 153, 155–57. 
 26 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–8. 
 27 See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 256–57 (noting that juveniles in prisons lack the opportunity to 
participate in rehabilitative programming and instead spend much of their time learning new criminal 
techniques from more skilled and experienced offenders). 
 28 MICHELE DEITCH ET AL., THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, FROM TIME OUT TO HARD TIME: YOUNG 
CHILDREN IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at xiv (2009), available at http://www. 
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/NR_TimeOut.pdf. 
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forty-eight hours of a juvenile’s entry into an adult facility.29 Juveniles are five 
times more likely to be sexually assaulted in adult facilities than in juvenile 
facilities.30 Although juveniles made up only .2% of the prison population in 
2005, they made up almost 1% of the substantiated incidents of inmate-on-
inmate sexual violence in prisons that year.31 Juveniles constituted less than 
1% of the jail population in 2005, but they made up 21% of all victims of 
substantiated incidents of inmate-on-inmate sexual violence in jails.32 In total, 
juveniles made up 7.7% of all victims of substantiated acts of sexual violence 
in prisons and jails carried out by other inmates, even though they made up less 
than 1% of the total detained and incarcerated population.33 
Sexual assault and rape may result in severe physical consequences, 
potentially exposing the victim to HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, and other sexually 
transmitted infections.34 Sexual activity between men, which constitutes the 
vast majority of prison rape, accounts for more than 50% of all new HIV 
infections in the United States.35 Rates of HIV and confirmed AIDS are more 
than five times higher among those incarcerated in prisons than in the general 
population of the United States.36 
Sexual abuse has severe and long-term emotional and psychological 
consequences for juveniles that may last well into adulthood.37 Sexual abuse 
can lead to major depression and posttraumatic stress disorder.38 Juveniles who 
have been sexually abused may face problems with anger, impulse control, 
flashbacks, dissociative episodes, hopelessness, despair, and persistent distrust 
and withdrawal.39 Sexual abuse can increase tendencies toward criminal 
 
 29 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4) (2006). 
 30 Id. 
 31 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 155–56. 
 32 Id. at 155. 
 33 Id. at 155–56. 
 34 Zulficar Gregory Restum, Commentary, Public Health Implications of Substandard Correctional 
Health Care, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1689, 1690 (2005). 
 35 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/factsheets/pdf/us_overview.pdf. 
 36 J. Taussig et al., HIV Transmission Among Male Inmates in a State Prison System—Georgia, 1992–
2005, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 421, 421 (2006), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
PDF/wk/mm5515.pdf. 
 37 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 153. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
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behavior and substance abuse in juveniles.40 Upon release from prison, victims 
of prison rape are more likely to become homeless or require government 
assistance due to the physical and psychological impacts of rape than are those 
who were not raped in prison.41 
Congress recognized the significant risks that juveniles face in adult 
facilities when it passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA).42 
PREA, which unanimously passed in the House of Representatives and Senate 
and was immediately enacted into law by President George W. Bush, sought to 
draw attention to and address the issues of rape43 and sexual victimization of 
individuals in custody.44 
The findings section of PREA highlights the increased risk of rape that 
juveniles face: “Young first-time offenders are at increased risk of sexual 
victimization. Juveniles are 5 times more likely to be sexually assaulted in 
adult rather than juvenile facilities—often within the first 48 hours of 
incarceration.”45 PREA requires prison officials to keep more thorough internal 
records on rape, and it created a commission to propose standards to improve 
prison management.46 Although an important symbolic step, PREA has failed 
 
 40 Id.; see also DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 194972, YOUTH 
VICTIMIZATION: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 9–10 (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/194972.pdf. 
 41 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 15601(11) (2006) (“Victims of prison rape 
suffer severe physical and psychological effects that hinder their ability to integrate into the community and 
maintain stable employment upon their release from prison. They are thus more likely to become homeless 
and/or require government assistance.”). 
 42 Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609). 
 43 The Prison Rape Elimination Act defines “rape” as the  
carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person, 
forcibly or against that person’s will; . . . the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual assault with 
an object, or sexual fondling of a person not forcibly or against the person’s will, where the 
victim is incapable of giving consent because of his or her youth or his or her temporary or 
permanent mental or physical incapacity; or . . . the carnal knowledge, oral sodomy, sexual 
assault with an object, or sexual fondling of a person achieved through the exploitation of the fear 
or threat of physical violence or bodily injury. 
Id. § 15609(9). 
 44 Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty of Addressing and 
Eliminating Rape in Prison, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119, 122, 167 (2009). 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 15601(4). 
 46 Thompson, supra note 44, at 168 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 15603(a)(1), 15606(e)(2)(L)). 
WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
2012] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 1453 
to eliminate or reduce sexual abuse in correctional facilities or to demonstrably 
change public attitudes toward rape in custodial settings.47 
Numerous factors contribute to why juveniles face significant dangers 
when confined with adults. In a Department of Justice report that described 
characteristics that make an individual more likely to be sexually abused while 
incarcerated, many of the listed characteristics are common in juveniles, 
including small size and inexperience with the criminal justice system.48 
Additionally, juveniles, who have not fully matured physically, cognitively, 
socially, or emotionally, are less capable of protecting themselves from sexual 
advances and assault.49 These juveniles generally also lack the experiences to 
cope in predatory environments, and expressions of fear may be taken as 
indications of weakness.50 
Staffing differences may also contribute to the high rates of sexual abuse in 
adult detention and correctional facilities because juvenile facilities generally 
have a much higher staff-to-inmate ratio than do adult facilities.51 Juvenile 
detention facilities generally have a ratio of one staff member to every eight 
youths, while an average adult jail has a staff-to-inmate ratio of one to sixty-
four.52 The additional staff members in juvenile facilities may provide 
increased supervision and may also offer assistance and support to juveniles in 
a more focused manner.53 
Incidents of sexual assault in jails and prisons are underreported,54 and 
juveniles may be particularly discouraged from reporting sexual abuse as a 
result of developmental, emotional, and systemic barriers.55 The ramifications 
of disclosure include shame, stigma, not being believed, and retaliation, which 
 
 47 See id. at 122 (citing Mary Sigler, By the Light of Virtue: Prison Rape and the Corruption of 
Character, 91 IOWA L. REV. 561, 568 (2006)) (“While an important symbolic first step, the bill has occasioned 
far too little discussion of implementation following its enactment. As important, there has been little or no 
change in public perception of—and attitudes toward—rape in prison.”). 
 48 STEVEN T. MCFARLAND ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON RAPE IN JAILS IN THE U.S. 6–8 (2008), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reviewpanel/pdfs/prea_finalreport_081229.pdf. 
 49 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 142 (citing Telephone Interview with 
Charlotte Price, Correctional Planner, N.C. Dep’t of Correction (Jan. 29, 2009)). 
 50 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 258. 
 51 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES: THE DANGERS OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN 
ADULT JAILS IN AMERICA 7 (2007), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/ 
CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 149 (2006). 
 55 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 150. 
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impact juveniles more significantly than adults.56 Juveniles may not be willing 
to undergo the intense scrutiny needed to determine the accuracy of a report of 
sexual assault.57 Once faced with formal interviews and investigation, juveniles 
may feel intimidated by the perpetrator, try to suppress the pain stemming from 
the abuse by denying it ever occurred, change their story, or refuse to 
cooperate with investigators.58 
Juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are also at a high risk of 
committing suicide.59 One study indicates that a juvenile housed in an adult jail 
is five times more likely to commit suicide than is a juvenile in the general 
population and eight times more likely to commit suicide than is a juvenile 
housed in a juvenile facility.60 Other studies suggest that a juvenile’s increased 
risk of suicide in adult jails may be far higher.61 
Not designed to meet the special needs of juveniles, adult facilities may 
seriously compromise a juvenile’s healthy development, and surveys of adult 
facilities indicate that they generally lack specialized or developmentally 
appropriate programming for juveniles.62 Adult facilities are generally far less 
equipped than juvenile facilities to meet the educational needs of juveniles.63 
In 95% of juvenile facilities, one teacher is employed for every fifteen inmates, 
in contrast to one teacher for every one hundred inmates in adult facilities.64 
Unlike in adult facilities, the educational staff members in juvenile facilities 
are generally full-time employees.65 In addition to an overall higher staff-to-
inmate ratio and more teachers, most juvenile facilities also include classroom 
spaces and do not have the same physical-space restrictions faced by many 
adult facilities.66 Juveniles confined in adult facilities, especially those in 
 
 56 See id.; see also id. at 152 (“Although trauma, fear of retaliation, and limited knowledge of legal rights 
and procedures discourage reporting among adults, the impact of these factors on youth is even greater.”). 
 57 See Thompson, supra note 44, at 130–31. 
 58 NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 152. 
 59 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 7–8. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See, e.g., CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4 (“Youth are 19 times more likely to 
commit suicide in jail than youth in the general population and 36 times more likely to commit suicide in an 
adult jail than in a juvenile detention facility.” (endnote omitted)). 
 62 See COUNCIL OF JUVENILE CORR. ADM’RS, POSITION STATEMENT: WAIVER AND TRANSFER OF YOUTHS 
TO ADULT SYSTEMS (2009), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CJCA%20 
Waiver%20and%20Transfer%20(2009).pdf. 
 63 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 7. 
 64 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 253. 
 65 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 7. 
 66 Id. 
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pretrial detention awaiting adjudication, face a high risk of falling more behind 
in their education.67 
Juvenile facilities are better able to provide developmentally appropriate 
healthcare, rehabilitative services, and programming than are adult facilities.68 
Adult facilities may fail to provide juveniles with the appropriate nutrition or 
dental and vision care, which are especially critical for developing 
adolescents.69 Staff members at juvenile facilities typically receive special 
training to work with juveniles not generally received by the staff at adult 
facilities.70 Many adult facilities fail to provide juveniles with even basic 
services, including prison-survival skills and counseling.71 In two-thirds of 
juvenile facilities, one counselor is employed for every ten juveniles, and in 
85% of juvenile facilities, at least one counselor is employed for every twenty-
five juveniles.72 A direct comparison to the number of counselors available in 
adult facilities is difficult because most adult facilities group all “professional 
and technical” personnel in one category, which includes all medical and 
classification staff.73 This staff-to-inmate ratio is one to twenty-five.74 Given 
their incomplete development, juveniles are significantly impacted by the lack 
of appropriate services and care in adult facilities.75 
Juveniles’ developmental stage and malleability make them particularly 
vulnerable to criminal socialization when incarcerated with adults.76 Generally 
sensitive to peer pressure as a group, juveniles confined in adult facilities are 
“especially likely to engage in violent behavior and to develop identities linked 
to domination and control.”77 While confined in adult facilities, juveniles lack 
models for building a positive identity, honing productive life skills, and 
solving problems and disputes.78 Rather, juveniles may spend considerable 
amounts of time with experienced adult offenders, who may pass along new 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 252–57. 
 69 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 6–7. 
 70 See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 66. 
 71 Id. at 66–67. 
 72 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 253. 
 73 Id. at 253–54. 
 74 Id. at 254. 
 75 See id. at 252, 257–58; infra Part II.A. 
 76 See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 257–58. 
 77 Id. at 258. 
 78 Id. 
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methods and techniques related to criminal activity and the avoidance of 
detection.79 
Juveniles may also adopt violent practices to mask their vulnerable status.80 
To survive the violence they encounter in adult facilities, juveniles have 
reported that they often attempt to fit in to inmate culture.81 Many juveniles 
can only adjust to life in adult prisons or jails by “accepting violence as a part 
of daily life and, thus, becoming even more violent.”82 
A body of evidence suggests that incarcerating juveniles in adult 
correctional facilities not only places the juveniles in a demonstrably more 
hazardous living situation but also does not fulfill commonly accepted 
purposes of punishment. Research indicates that incarcerating juveniles with 
adults, an often more experienced criminal population, may neither deter 
juveniles from future criminal activity nor improve public safety.83 In 2007, the 
Task Force on Community Preventive Services, supported by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, systematically evaluated published studies 
that dealt with the effectiveness of policies that result in the transfer of 
juveniles to criminal court.84 The task force scrutinized the design suitability, 
methodologies, execution, and outcomes of these studies.85 
In its analysis of six studies examining specific deterrence,86 all of which 
controlled for selection bias, the task force noted that four studies found that 
transferred juveniles subsequently committed more violent and cumulative 
crime than their counterparts who remained in the juvenile justice system.87 
 
 79 Id. at 257. “Prisons are schools for crime; offenders learn new skills for the illegitimate labor market in 
prison and become more deeply enmeshed in criminal subcultures. Prison can be an embittering experience 
that leaves offenders more angry at the world than when they went in.” John Braithwaite, A Future Where 
Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1738 (1999). 
 80 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 7–8. 
 81 RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 220595, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE 
DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 7–8 (2010), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf. 
 82 Id. at 8. 
 83 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 5–6 (citing Angela McGowan et al., Effects on 
Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the 
Adult Justice System: A Systematic Review, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S7, S7–28 (2007)). 
 84 McGowan et al., supra note 83. 
 85 Id. at S12. 
 86 Specific, or special, deterrence is the goal of punishment to dissuade an individual offender from 
committing offenses in the future. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 514 (9th ed. 2009). 
 87 McGowan et al., supra note 83, at S14–15. One study found no effect on the recidivism of transferred 
juveniles, and one study found slightly lower recidivism rates for transferred juveniles who initially committed 
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These four studies indicate that transferred juveniles were 33.7% more likely 
to be re-arrested than juveniles who remained in the juvenile justice system.88 
The task force concluded that “juveniles transferred to the adult justice system 
have greater rates of subsequent violence than juveniles retained in the juvenile 
justice system” and that “[t]ransferring juveniles to the adult justice system is 
counterproductive as a strategy for deterring subsequent violence.”89 This 
increase in recidivism may be partially attributable to confinement in adult 
facilities, given that juveniles are held with more experienced adult offenders 
and lack the rehabilitative opportunities available in juvenile facilities.90 Some 
researchers have concluded that incarceration with adults may have 
“brutalizing effects” on juveniles, in which the violent experiences that 
juveniles witness and experience in adult facilities normalize violent and 
criminal conduct.91 
Research is generally inconclusive as to whether conviction in criminal 
court and incarceration in adult facilities deters potential juvenile offenders.92 
Most evidence indicates that transfer to criminal court and incarceration in 
adult facilities has little or no general deterrent effect.93 Accordingly, an 
accumulating body of evidence suggests that incarcerating juveniles in adult 
facilities fails to demonstrably deter future crime, and perhaps even increases 
recidivism rates in juvenile offenders, while dramatically increasing the risk of 
serious harm faced by these vulnerable wards of the state. 
Although some seek to justify the confinement of juveniles with adults by 
pointing to the need for increased criminal sanctions for certain hardened 
juvenile offenders, many juveniles who are convicted of criminal offenses and 
confined in adult facilities serve sentences comparable in length to the ones 
that they would have served if held in juvenile facilities.94 Seventy-eight 
percent of juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are released before they turn 
twenty-one; ninety-five percent are released before they turn twenty-five.95 
The average time that these juveniles serve on their sentences is two years and 
 
property offenses, although it found higher rates of recidivism for transferred juveniles arrested for all crimes 
other than property offenses. Id. at S14. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at S15. 
 90 REDDING, supra note 81, at 7; McGowan et al., supra note 83, at S19. 
 91 REDDING, supra note 81, at 8. 
 92 Id. at 2. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1–2. 
 95 Id. 
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eight months.96 Additionally, some jurisdictions have implemented systems in 
which a juvenile convicted in criminal court can serve his sentence in a 
juvenile detention facility until he reaches the age of eighteen, at which time he 
can be transferred to an adult facility to serve the remaining time of his 
sentence if necessary.97 
Juveniles housed in adult facilities face extreme risks to their health and 
well-being without the benefit of developmentally appropriate services and 
rehabilitative programming. Exposed to alarmingly high rates of physical and 
sexual abuse, these children face the real possibility of developing 
psychological and emotional disorders, contracting sexually transmitted 
infections, or even committing suicide. Adult facilities, with often dramatically 
lower staff-to-inmate ratios than juvenile facilities, are not equipped to handle 
the special educational, developmental, physical, and emotional needs of 
juveniles, and thus deprive them of critical opportunities for rehabilitation. In 
fact, confinement in adult facilities may foster more violent behaviors, 
facilitate opportunities for criminal socialization, and increase recidivism. 
B. Numbers of Juveniles Confined in Adult Facilities 
On any given day, thousands of juveniles are housed with adult offenders 
in jails and prisons.98 The primary means by which a juvenile finds himself in 
an adult facility is when he is prosecuted as an adult in criminal court.99 
Throughout the 1990s, public fear of the juvenile “super-predator,”100 
predictions about growth among certain segments of the population, and 
public-safety concerns led to a movement to prosecute more juveniles in 
criminal court.101 During the 1990s, nearly every state legislature expanded its 
 
 96 Id. at 2. 
 97 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 24. 
 98 MINTON, supra note 11, at 9 tbl.6; WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21. 
 99 HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212906, JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 236 (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ 
nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. Approximately 250,000 juveniles are prosecuted in adult court each year. 
NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010 
REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2011), available at http://www. 
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf. 
 100 John DiIulio, then a professor at Princeton University, first used the term “super-predator” in 1995 to 
describe what some thought to be a new emerging group of hardened, predatory, and remorseless juvenile 
offenders. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 
23; see also Mark Soler et al., Juvenile Justice—Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
483, 486 (2009). 
 101 Soler et al., supra note 100, at 492. 
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existing transfer provisions or created new transfer mechanisms that made it 
easier to prosecute juveniles in criminal court.102 The number of juveniles 
transferred to criminal court rose in most states, which led to their placement in 
adult-detention and adult-correctional facilities while awaiting disposition and 
following conviction.103 Between 1990 and 1999, the number of juveniles held 
in adult jails increased by more than 300%, while the overall adult jail inmate 
population only increased by 48%.104 Between 1986 and 1995, the number of 
juveniles entering adult prisons also rose each year.105 
Thousands of juveniles are detained and incarcerated with adults each year. 
In many states, juveniles are housed with the general adult population.106 On 
an annual one-day count in 2009, 7220 juveniles were confined in adult jails, 
most either awaiting disposition in criminal court or serving sentences of less 
than one year.107 In 2009, 2778 juveniles were incarcerated in adult prisons on 
the annual one-day count of prison populations.108 Given high turnover rates, 
the total number of juveniles confined in jails and prisons over the course of 
one year may be ten to twenty times higher than the numbers gathered in the 
one-day count.109 
National consensus, however, may be forming against confining juveniles 
with adults. State legislatures and prison officials are beginning to realize the 
dangers of confining juveniles with adults. Between 1996 and 2004, the 
number of juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons fell by 54%, even as prison 
 
 102 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 113. All states have set the upper limit of original jurisdiction 
for juvenile court at the age of fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. BENJAMIN ADAMS & SEAN ADDIE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 230167, DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT, 2007, at 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/230167.pdf. Three types of statutes provide for the transfer of juveniles to 
criminal court: (i) judicial transfer laws that allow or require a judge to determine whether juvenile court 
jurisdiction will be waived following a court hearing, (ii) prosecutorial direct-file laws that give both juvenile 
and criminal courts original jurisdiction and allow the prosecutor to determine within which jurisdiction to file 
the case, and (iii) automatic-transfer laws that designate certain cases that must be filed in criminal court based 
on characteristics of the offense or juvenile. REDDING, supra note 81, at 2. For a comprehensive history and 
analysis of transfer provisions and the waiver of juveniles to adult court, see THE CHANGING BORDERS OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. 
Zimring eds., 2000). 
 103 REDDING, supra note 81, at 1. 
 104 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 236. 
 105 Id. at 237. 
 106 Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 252. 
 107 MINTON, supra note 11, at 9 tbl.6. Of these juveniles, 5847 were held as adults and 1373 were held as 
juveniles. Id. 
 108 WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21. 
 109 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 41; CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4. 
WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
1460 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1445 
populations grew.110 On the day of the annual count of prison inmates in 2009, 
seven states did not house any juveniles in adult prisons,111 twelve states 
housed between one and ten juveniles in adult prisons,112 and an additional ten 
states housed between ten and twenty-five juveniles in adult prisons.113 By the 
annual one-day count of adult jail inmate populations in 2011, the number of 
juveniles being held in jails had declined to 5900.114 Furthermore, some states 
have taken steps to require the sight-and-sound separation of juveniles and 
adults when juveniles are placed in adult facilities. Of the thirty-nine states that 
allow juveniles to be held in adult jails while awaiting trial in criminal court, 
twenty states require that juveniles be separated from adults during this 
period.115 Even states that currently house higher numbers of juveniles in adult 
facilities, such as Pennsylvania,116 are beginning to take steps to decrease the 
number of juveniles in their adult facilities.117 
II. JUVENILES AND ADULTS: DIFFERENT AND TREATED DIFFERENTLY 
As described in Part I, juvenile offenders face significantly greater dangers 
when confined with adults in jails and prisons, and thousands of juveniles in 
the United States face these dangers on any given day. A growing body of 
evidence indicates that juveniles are significantly different from adults. The 
disparity in the dangers faced by juveniles and adults when confined in adult 
 
 110 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 237. 
 111 WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21. These states are California, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, and West Virginia. Id. 
 112 Id. These states are Alaska (seven juveniles in adult prisons), Hawaii (two juveniles in adult prisons), 
Kansas (five juveniles in adult prisons), Massachusetts (eight juveniles in adult prisons), Montana (one 
juvenile in adult prisons), New Mexico (three juveniles in adult prisons), Rhode Island (one juvenile in adult 
prisons), South Dakota (one juvenile in adult prisons), Utah (six juveniles in adult prisons), Vermont (four 
juveniles in adult prisons), Washington (two juveniles in adult prisons), and Wyoming (one juvenile in adult 
prisons). Id. 
 113 Id. These states are Arkansas (seventeen juveniles in adult prisons), Iowa (thirteen juveniles in adult 
prisons), Louisiana (fifteen juveniles in adult prisons), Minnesota (thirteen juveniles in adult prisons), 
Nebraska (twenty-one juveniles in adult prisons), New Jersey (twenty-one juveniles in adult prisons), 
Oklahoma (nineteen juveniles in adult prisons), Oregon (thirteen juveniles in adult prisons), Tennessee 
(twenty-two juveniles in adult prisons), and Virginia (sixteen juveniles in adult prisons). Id. 
 114 See TODD D. MINTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 237961, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2011—
STATISTICAL TABLES 6 tbl.6 (2012), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim11st.pdf. 
 115 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 14, 24. 
 116 On the day of the annual count in 2009, Pennsylvania housed sixty-one juveniles in its adult prisons. 
WEST, supra note 11, at 24 tbl.21. 
 117 See ARYA, supra note 99, at 26. Signed into law in October 2010, Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1169 
permits a juvenile being tried in the adult criminal system to be “de-certified” and held at a juvenile facility. 
S.B. 1169, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2010). 
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facilities, coupled with the inherent differences between juveniles and adults, 
raises important constitutional issues. A punishment that passes constitutional 
muster when applied to adults may be unconstitutional when applied to 
juveniles. 
This Part argues that juveniles and adults demonstrate significant 
differences in physical and mental development and have appropriately been 
treated differently under the law. Section A describes the significant 
developmental differences between juveniles and adults. Section B discusses 
the treatment of juveniles under state and federal law. Section C summarizes 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving children, which highlights the 
constitutionally significant differences between juveniles and adults. Section D 
describes the history and purposes of the juvenile justice system, which was 
created to respond to the special needs of juveniles. Section E examines 
international norms surrounding the confinement of juveniles with adults. 
A. Developmental Characteristics of Juveniles 
Scientific research highlights many differences between juveniles and 
adults that militate against confining them together.118 Although some young 
people now experience the physical changes of puberty earlier than in the past, 
which may result in an appearance of maturity at an earlier age, most aspects 
of cognitive development, such as the development of self-regulatory capacity 
and skills, reasoning ability, planning, logic, and understanding the 
consequences of actions, increase according to biological (i.e., numerical) age 
and experiences, rather than according to the child’s stage of physical 
development.119 
The sexual abuse and lack of access to programming and treatment in adult 
facilities negatively affects the development of juveniles, and they are more 
susceptible to harm from maltreatment than adults. Magnetic resonance 
imaging indicates that a particular section of a juvenile’s frontal lobe, which 
controls decision making and other advanced functions,120 is not fully 
developed and continues to undergo significant change after an individual’s 
 
 118 See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth and Gray Matter Density 
Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 8819, 8826–28 (2001). 
 119 Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain Development: A Period of Vulnerabilities and Opportunities, 1021 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 15, 18 (2004). 
 120 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 14. 
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eighteenth birthday.121 In fact, research shows that the human brain continues 
to develop and mature well into an individual’s twenties.122 Juveniles also have 
a relatively unformed character.123 During adolescence, an individual’s identity 
begins to develop and emerge, and the individual’s interactions with his 
surroundings heavily influence this identity formation.124 
Because a juvenile’s brain is still developing and his character has not been 
fully formed, juveniles are generally capable of change.125 Developmental 
psychologists emphasize that adolescence is “a period of tremendous 
malleability,” in which all experiences “have a great deal of influence over the 
course of development.”126 Given their development throughout adolescence, 
juveniles are more amenable to change than are adults.127 Therefore, the 
rehabilitative programming available in juvenile facilities may be more 
effective with this malleable and responsive population.128 
B. Treatment of Juveniles Under Federal and State Law 
Congress and all fifty state legislatures recognize the differences between 
juveniles and adults and have created laws based upon those differences. These 
laws acknowledge the import of a juvenile’s continued development and seek 
to protect developing juveniles from their own immaturity and lack of 
responsibility.129 In 1988, Justice Stevens noted, “[W]e assume that [children] 
do not yet act as adults do, and thus [society] act[s] in their interest by 
restricting certain choices that we feel they are not yet ready to make with full 
benefit of the costs and benefits attending such decisions.”130 
 
 121 Id.; Sowell et al., supra note 118, at 8826. 
 122 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 14. 
 123 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 
(2003). 
 124 See id. 
 125 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN TO 
DIE IN PRISON 7 (2007), available at http://eji.org/eji/files/20071017cruelandunusual.pdf. 
 126 Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON 
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz 
eds., 2000). 
 127 McGowan et al., supra note 83, at S8. 
 128 See id. at S12–20. 
 129 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 6. 
 130 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 825 n.23 (1988) (plurality opinion). In Thompson, the Court 
held the death penalty to be an unconstitutional punishment for individuals who committed the relevant 
offense before the age of sixteen. Id. at 838. 
WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
2012] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 1463 
All states have laws that treat juveniles differently from adults, which stems 
from the recognition of the many differences between juveniles and adults.131 
Each state restricts juveniles’ authority and decision making by setting the age 
of majority to be at least eighteen.132 Prior to reaching the age of majority, an 
individual does not have the authority to vote, serve on a jury, create a binding 
legal contract, purchase and possess a firearm, serve in the military, or 
gamble.133 States have determined that, before the age of eighteen, juveniles do 
not have the requisite decision-making capability and autonomy to initiate and 
participate in these acts. 
Most states also restrict a juvenile’s right to engage in certain activities 
without parental or judicial consent, including getting an abortion,134 getting 
married,135 purchasing pornography,136 getting a tattoo,137 or getting a body 
piercing.138 All states restrict individuals under the age of twenty-one from 
purchasing alcohol, and most restrict juveniles under the age of eighteen from 
purchasing tobacco, getting a driver’s license without restrictions, or engaging 
in transactions with pawnbrokers.139 
A juvenile cannot personally bring a suit in court against another party.140 
A court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a juvenile 
and his interests in litigation.141 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure group 
minors and incompetents together as a class that cannot sue or defend on their 
own behalf.142 If a minor or incompetent does not have “a duly appointed 
representative,” such as a general guardian, a conservator, or a like fiduciary, 
the Rules require a next friend or a guardian ad litem “to protect a minor or 
 
 131 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 9. 
 132 Id. at 11. 
 133 Id. at 10–11. 
 134 In thirty-nine states, a juvenile must get parental or judicial consent to get an abortion. Id. at 11. 
 135 In thirty-six states and the District of Columbia, a juvenile cannot get married without parental 
consent. Id. 
 136 In forty-eight states, youth under the age of eighteen cannot purchase pornography either absolutely or 
without parental consent. Id. 
 137 In forty-two states, a youth under eighteen is either absolutely prohibited from getting or must obtain 
parental consent to get a tattoo. Id. 
 138 In thirty-three states, a youth under eighteen is either absolutely prohibited from getting or must obtain 
parental consent to get a body piercing. Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:25 (4th ed. 
1993 & Supp. 2009). 
 141 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 25 (2010). 
 142 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c). 
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incompetent person who is unrepresented in an action.”143 A juvenile also 
generally cannot be compelled to specifically perform a contract while under 
the age of eighteen.144 
The federal government has recognized the differences between juveniles 
and adults, and the dangers inherent in confining juveniles in facilities in which 
they come into contact with adult offenders. The Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act145 (JJDPA), enacted in 1974 and most recently 
reauthorized in 2002, hinges a state’s receipt of federal funding for juvenile 
justice initiatives on its adherence to a number of guidelines.146 The JJDPA 
prohibits the confinement of juveniles prosecuted in juvenile court in “any 
institution in which they have contact with adult inmates,”147 which has come 
to be known as the sight-and-sound-separation requirement.148 
The JJDPA creates limited exceptions that allow for the placement of a 
juvenile in an adult facility for a short period of time before or after a court 
appearance, while awaiting transfer to a juvenile facility, in a rural area 
without any nearby juvenile facilities, or during periods of unsafe travel 
conditions.149 In each of these circumstances, the JJDPA requires that 
“juveniles do not have contact with adult inmates.”150 The JJDPA also requires 
that states adopt policies mandating that those who work in penal facilities 
housing juveniles be “trained and certified to work with juveniles.”151 Even 
though the developmental vulnerability of juveniles tried as adults remains 
diminished, the JJDPA does not apply to juveniles charged and tried as 
adults.152 
 
 143 Id. 
 144 See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 140. 
 145 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 146 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (2006). 
 147 Id. § 5633(a)(12)(A). 
 148 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 97. 
 149 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(13). 
 150 Id. § 5633(a)(13)(A), (B)(i)(I). 
 151 Id. § 5633(a)(13)(A), (B)(i)(II). 
 152 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 7; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR MONITORING FACILITIES UNDER THE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 2002 § 2.5, at 17 (2010), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/ 
compliance/guidancemanual2010.pdf (“A juvenile who has been transferred or waived or is otherwise under 
the jurisdiction of a criminal court does not have to be separated from adult criminal offenders.”). 
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Numerous state and federal laws recognize and enforce the differences 
between juveniles and adults. Through the JJDPA, Congress has specifically 
highlighted how these differences implicate confining juveniles with adults. 
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Juveniles 
Differences between juveniles and adults have been recognized as having 
both legal and scientific significance. Accordingly, the United States Supreme 
Court has treated and continues to treat juveniles as a class separate from 
adults. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized juveniles as developmentally 
different from adults in both civil and criminal matters. Justice Frankfurter 
once famously noted that “[c]hildren have a very special place in life which 
law should reflect.”153 He warned that “[l]egal theories . . . readily lead to 
fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State’s 
duty towards children.”154 Accordingly, the Court has embraced the notion that 
juveniles can and sometimes must be treated differently than adults throughout 
its jurisprudence. 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court held that a state may require a pregnant minor 
to get either parental or judicial consent for her reproductive choices because 
minors often lack the capacity to independently make informed decisions.155 
The Court noted three reasons that justified “the conclusion that the 
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults.”156 The 
Court based its conclusion on “the peculiar vulnerability of children; their 
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the 
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”157 The Court opined, 
“[A]lthough children generally are protected by the same constitutional 
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled 
to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability.”158 
In Bellotti, the Court noted its past holdings, in which it allowed states to 
“limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of 
 
 153 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 154 Id. 
 155 443 U.S. 622, 635, 647–48 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
 156 Id. at 634. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. at 635. 
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important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences.”159 The 
Court characterized some of its past decisions as having been “grounded in the 
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, 
[juveniles] often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize 
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”160 
In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld a state’s right to 
restrict a minor’s work schedule.161 In Prince, an adult guardian permitted a 
child in her custody to sell religious literature on a public street, which violated 
the state’s child-labor statute.162 Even though the child had expressed a 
personal desire to engage in this activity, which was also an exercise of 
religion, the Court upheld the guardian’s conviction under the state statute 
because “the interests of society to protect the welfare of children” and the 
“opportunities for growth into free and independent well-developed men and 
citizens” allowed the state to enforce the statute, which would be 
unconstitutional if applied to adults.163 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Court expanded the due process rights of 
juveniles, while still emphasizing the constitutionally significant differences 
between juveniles and adults that supported differential treatment in the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems. In its 1967 decision in In re Gault, the 
Court expanded the procedural due process rights conferred upon juveniles in 
delinquency proceedings in juvenile court.164 In its decision, the Court 
extended to juveniles the right to counsel, the right to notice of the charges 
brought against them, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and 
the right against self-incrimination.165 Even as the Court granted these rights to 
juveniles, it acknowledged and affirmed the value of the rehabilitative 
principles upon which the juvenile court system had been founded.166 The 
Court commended the “principles relating to the processing and treatment of 
juveniles separately from adults” and emphasized that the procedural issues of 
the case did not in any way affect the separate processing and treatment of 
juveniles.167 Juveniles who are processed in juvenile court, however, do not 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 321 U.S. 158, 168–70 (1944). 
 162 Id. at 161–62. 
 163 See id. at 164–65. 
 164 387 U.S. 1, 31–64 (1967). 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 21–22. 
 167 Id. at 22. 
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receive all the same due process protections as those processed in criminal 
court. For example, juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile 
proceedings,168 which is a constitutional right for an individual charged with a 
nonpetty crime in criminal court.169 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving juveniles has emphasized the 
many constitutionally significant differences between juveniles and adults. The 
Court has explicitly stated that the Constitution may apply differently to 
juveniles and adults.170 Even when the Court expanded constitutional due 
process rights for juveniles, the Court continued to recognize juveniles as a 
class separate from adults, and juvenile proceedings and treatment as different 
from adult proceedings and treatment.171 
D. History of the Juvenile Justice System 
The history of the juvenile justice system reflects the deeply rooted belief 
in the importance of the differences between juveniles and adults in our legal 
system. Since its founding, the juvenile justice system has emphasized 
rehabilitation, which has not been a major focus of criminal courts. First 
established in 1899, juvenile courts were created to deal separately and 
differently with juveniles who committed offenses.172 Prior to 1899, children 
were tried in the criminal justice system in the same manner as adult 
offenders.173 Early reformers contemplated a juvenile justice system in which 
youthful offenders received treatment to eliminate antisocial tendencies, and 
 
 168 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“[T]rial by jury in the 
juvenile court’s adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement.”). 
 169 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right 
of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee.”). 
 170 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (“[O]ur acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the 
adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from 
adults.”). 
 171 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 22. 
 172 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 5. The first juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899. Id. The 
act that established this court 
stressed that the court should serve a rehabilitative, rather than punitive, purpose; created a 
provision that juvenile court records be maintained confidentially and separately from criminal 
records to minimize stigma; mandated the physical separation of youths from adults when 
incarcerated or placed in the same institution; and included a provision barring the detention of 
children under the age of twelve in jails under any circumstances. 
Id. at 5–6. 
 173 AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 11, at ix. 
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the newly created juvenile system rejected concepts of criminal responsibility 
and punishment.174 
By 1925, forty-six states and the District of Columbia had established 
separate juvenile court systems.175 Based on the notion that juveniles are 
different from adults, these courts focused on treating and rehabilitating a child 
with a clinical, rather than punitive, focus guiding the process from initial 
apprehension through institutionalization.176 Juvenile courts sought to facilitate 
nonadversarial proceedings, during which the judge and other participants 
determined the best methods to rehabilitate the youthful offender.177 
Beginning in the 1960s, the juvenile justice system faced criticism and 
underwent considerable change.178 Despite changes and additions to the body 
of due process standards applying to juvenile court proceedings,179 all states 
continue to maintain a juvenile court system separate from the criminal justice 
system that provides independent courts and facilities to process juveniles.180 
Juvenile courts generally continue to embrace rehabilitation as a necessary 
response to the delinquent behavior of youthful offenders.181 Juvenile detention 
facilities generally provide more programming and treatment, with a 
rehabilitative focus, than adult facilities.182 Experts continue to emphasize the 
recent psychological and neurological studies that demonstrate the critical need 
to offer rehabilitative services to young offenders.183 
 
 174 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 
FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008, at 15, 16. 
 175 DEITCH ET AL., supra note 28, at 6. 
 176 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–16. 
 177 Kristin Henning, What’s Wrong with Victims’ Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus 
Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1107, 1112 (2009). 
 178 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 174, at 17. 
 179 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31–64; Kent v. United States, 
383 U.S. 541, 560–63 (1966). 
 180 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 99, at 106. 
 181 Henning, supra note 177, at 1112. “While most [state juvenile court codes’] purpose clauses still 
manifest a commitment to the rehabilitation of children, those clauses now also reflect a growing concern for 
the interests of victims, the accountability of the offending youth, the safety of the community, and sometimes 
even the punishment of the child.” Id. at 1113–14. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-101(a)(2) (2009) 
(“Consistent with the protection of the public interest, remove from children committing delinquent acts the 
taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior and substitute . . . a program of treatment, 
training and rehabilitation . . . .”). 
 182 See NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, supra note 1, at 142. 
 183 Henning, supra note 177, at 1118–19. 
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Because the majority of juveniles detained or incarcerated in adult facilities 
are either awaiting disposition in criminal court or serving sentences after 
conviction in criminal court, research focused on the challenges faced by 
juveniles transferred to criminal court illuminates several age-related 
differences that may also be relevant to incarcerating juveniles with adults. 
Research on juveniles tried as adults shows that juveniles face unique risks in 
the adult criminal justice system.184 Juveniles are particularly susceptible to 
coercive interrogation techniques because of their diminished status in relation 
to the adults who interrogate them, beliefs about the need to obey authority 
figures, dependence on adults, and particular vulnerability to intimidation.185 
Accordingly, the danger that juveniles will give false confessions is higher, 
which seriously compromises the fact-finding process.186 Juveniles have a 
decreased understanding of their rights, difficulties comprehending the trial 
process, limited language skills, and inadequate decision-making abilities, all 
of which may compromise their experience in and the ultimate outcome of 
their processing in the criminal justice system.187 
These age-related deficits implicate the Eighth Amendment because they 
render juveniles as a class more vulnerable to coercion, less capable of 
defending themselves against abuse, more subject to peer pressure, more 
vulnerable to criminal socialization, and less capable of surviving in the hostile 
jail and prison environments dominated by adult inmates. The United States 
has long recognized that the differences between juveniles and adults require 
separate processing and treatment for juvenile offenders. The continued 
existence of juvenile courts and juvenile-detention and correctional facilities 
underscores the widespread recognition that the developmental needs of 
juveniles require different and more rehabilitative treatment than adult 
offenders. 
E. International Norms Involving the Confinement of Juveniles with Adults 
Many states’ allowance of the confinement of juveniles with adults deviates 
from international norms; both international bodies and numerous countries 
throughout the world eschew the incarceration of juveniles with adults.188 The 
 
 184 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 125, at 8. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Michelle India Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: The Betrayal of Childhood in the United 
States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177, 180–81, 184–89 (1996). 
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United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child189 (CRC), the primary 
international document that lays out the rights of children who come into 
contact with the law,190 recognizes that children’s unique status grants them 
special protection.191 The CRC notes that “[n]o child shall be subjected to 
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”192 The 
CRC discourages holding children in any type of detention or correctional 
facility.193 The CRC further states, “Every child deprived of liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, 
and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her 
age.”194 If a period of detention does occur, the CRC emphasizes the critical 
importance of separating juveniles from adults.195 
Countries throughout the world have rejected the incarceration of juveniles 
with adults. Great Britain does not incarcerate children under the age of 
eighteen with adults.196 Rather, facilities designated especially for juveniles 
house all children under the age of eighteen, regardless of their offense.197 
Following its ratification of the CRC in 1993, New Zealand prohibited the 
incarceration of children under the age of seventeen in adult facilities.198 In 
Sweden, individuals under the age of twenty may not be incarcerated in adult 
facilities.199 In its Bill of Rights, the South African constitution forbids the 
incarceration of any children under the age of eighteen with adults.200 
 
 189 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered 
into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
 190 Baird & Samuels, supra note 188, at 184. The CRC was unanimously adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on November 20, 1989. Id. The United States has not ratified the CRC, even though both 
the House of Representatives and Senate passed resolutions supporting it. Id. at 185. 
 191 Deborah Labelle, Bringing Human Rights Home to the World of Detention, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 79, 118 (2008). 
 192 CRC, supra note 189, art. 37(a). 
 193 See id. art. 37(b) (“The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child . . . shall be used only as a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time . . . .”). 
 194 Id. art. 37(c). 
 195 See id. (“[E]very child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the 
child’s best interest not to do so . . . .”). 
 196 Anthony Bottoms & James Dignan, Youth Justice in Great Britain, 31 CRIME & JUST. 21, 89 (2004). 
Once a young offender in Britain reaches the age of twelve, he may be given a detention and training order 
(DTO) that may last between four and twenty-four months. Id. The first half of the DTO is served in custody 
with other juveniles, and the second half is served in the community with supervision. Id. 
 197 Id. at 90–91. 
 198 Allison Morris, Youth Justice in New Zealand, 31 CRIME & JUST. 243, 285–86 (2004). 
 199 Carl-Gunnar Janson, Youth Justice in Sweden, 31 CRIME & JUST. 391, 419 (2004). 
 200 S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 28(g). 
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A large body of scientific research demonstrates the many developmental 
differences between juveniles and adults. State governments, Congress, and the 
United States Supreme Court have consistently and traditionally recognized 
that these differences implicate the treatment of juveniles under the law. In 
fact, the existence of a juvenile court system in every jurisdiction in the United 
States reflects this understanding that children should generally be treated 
differently from adults. International norms also recognize the significant 
differences between juveniles and adults, and international bodies and many 
countries reject the confinement of juveniles with adults. 
III.  THE SUPREME COURT’S EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The previous Part considered the ways in which the law treats juveniles and 
adults differently and some of the underlying justifications for this differential 
treatment. The existence and legal recognition of these differences raise 
important constitutional issues with respect to whether housing juveniles with 
adults violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against “cruel and 
unusual punishment.”201 This Part begins by describing the development of the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and then explores the 
Court’s creation of categorical rules against specific sentencing practices as 
applied to certain offenders, including two types of punishment that have been 
found to violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to juveniles: the death 
penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 
nonhomicide offenses. This Part then examines a recent decision in which the 
Court relied upon the principles in these categorical-rule cases to again 
conclude that juveniles’ distinctive characteristics affect the constitutionality of 
sentencing practices as applied to them. 
 
 201 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth 
Amendment applies to individuals following an adjudication of guilt. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 
671 n.40 (1977). Prior to formal adjudication, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments guarantee individuals’ rights in relation to the criminal justice process, including pretrial 
conditions of confinement. See id. at 671–72 n.40; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979). 
Pretrial detainees may not be subjected to pre-adjudicatory detention conditions that amount to punishment. 
Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. The Supreme Court has noted that pretrial detainees’ substantive due process claims 
regarding conditions of confinement must receive at the least the same level of protection as claims brought 
under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 545; see also City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 
(1983). The majority of circuits utilize Eighth Amendment standards to determine whether pretrial detainees 
face violation of their substantive due process rights. David C. Gorlin, Note, Evaluating Punishment in 
Purgatory: The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement Claims from Inadequate 
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 421–22 (2009). This Comment will use Eighth 
Amendment standards to consider challenges to conditions of confinement for juveniles being held before and 
after conviction. 
WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
1472 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1445 
The Eighth Amendment’s proscriptions are incisive: “Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”202 The Eighth Amendment is incorporated against the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.203 
Section A presents an overview of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence regarding cruel and unusual punishment. Section B examines the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis when it develops a categorical rule that 
prohibits a particular group from receiving a particular punishment. Section C 
examines how the Court has drawn upon these categorical-rule cases to further 
limit sentencing practices as applied to juveniles.  
A. Overview 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”204 At 
its most basic level, the Eighth Amendment forbids “the imposition of 
inherently barbaric punishments,” such as torture, “under all circumstances.”205 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that what constitutes “cruel and 
unusual punishment” is “not static” and “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”206 
This “evolving standards of decency” assessment is built on the notion that 
society changes, and therefore, determinations about the cruel and unusual 
nature of punishments also change. The Court has noted that the Eighth 
Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized 
standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against which we must evaluate penal 
measures.”207 
The reach of the Eighth Amendment extends beyond “inherently barbaric” 
punishments to punishments that are disproportionate to a crime.208 The 
Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the 
Eighth Amendment.”209 The ban on cruel and unusual punishment embodies a 
“precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
 
 202 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 203 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 204 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 205 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010). 
 206 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 207 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Jackson 
v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
 208 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 209 Id. 
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proportioned to [the] offense.”210 The concept of proportionality demands that 
criminal sanctions consider both the offender and harm.211 Cases in which the 
Court has examined proportionality generally fall into one of two categories: 
those in which it assessed a term-of-years sentence in light of all the 
circumstances of the case and those in which it categorically restricted certain 
punishments.212 In the first category of cases,213 the Court made a threshold 
comparison of the offense and severity of the sentence to determine whether a 
specific term of years was a grossly disproportionate sentence for an individual 
defendant.214 If the Court inferred gross disproportionality, it then compared 
imposed sentences in the same and other jurisdictions.215 More on the second 
category of cases will follow. 
Although the Court has generally focused on whether criminal sanctions 
violate the Eighth Amendment,216 the Court has acknowledged that specific 
conditions of confinement may also fall under the purview of the Eighth 
 
 210 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). 
 211 Scott & Steinberg, supra note 174, at 19. 
 212 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 213 See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Court held that a sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole as applied to a defendant convicted of passing a worthless check, his 
seventh nonviolent offense, violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 279, 281, 303. 
 214 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 884 
(2009). Scholars and even Supreme Court Justices disagree on what constitutes punishment for Eighth 
Amendment purposes. Traditional definitions of punishment generally contemplate only the legal 
consequences of a criminal conviction. John Rawls offered an oft-quoted definition of punishment in 1955: 
[A] person is said to suffer punishment whenever he is legally deprived of some of the normal 
rights of a citizen on the ground that he has violated a rule of law, the violation having been 
established by trial according to the due process of law, provided that the deprivation is carried 
out by the recognized legal authorities of the state, that the rule of law clearly specifies both the 
offense and the attached penalty, that the courts construe statutes strictly, and that the statute was 
on the books prior to the time of the offense. This definition specifies what I shall understand by 
punishment. 
John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 10 (1955) (footnote omitted). Some scholars urge the 
adoption of a conception of punishment that assesses whether harm stems from the state’s response to a 
criminal conviction, which would encompass most conditions of confinement. See Ristroph, supra note 54, at 
168 (“The ‘penal’ status of an act or practice should depend not on specific legislative designation or 
individual intent, but on whether the act or practice is a necessary element or direct consequence of the state’s 
response to an individual’s criminal conviction.”); see also Dolovich, supra, at 908 (“Any harm people 
experience while incarcerated should therefore be cognizable under the Eighth Amendment if it is traceable to 
state-created conditions of confinement.”). 
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Amendment.217 Despite the use of a highly restrictive test,218 the Court has 
deemed that the Eighth Amendment may not only constrain the criminal 
penalty but also govern prison officials’ administration of otherwise 
constitutional penalties.219 The Court has found that the protection afforded an 
inmate “against other inmates” constitutes a “conditio[n] of confinement” 
subject to the Eighth Amendment.220 The Court has held that denial of medical 
care could constitute cruel and unusual punishment because it could result in 
pain and suffering unrelated to penological goals.221 In addition, prison 
conditions that “increase violence among inmates or create other conditions 
intolerable for prison confinement” might constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.222 The Court has also acknowledged that sexual assaults in 
correctional facilities may be covered by the Eighth Amendment.223 
B. The Creation of Eighth Amendment Categorical Rules 
The second category of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
proportionality analysis involves those cases in which the Court established 
categorical rules about what punishments are cruel and unusual when applied 
to an entire category of offenders or to certain offenses.224 In two such cases, 
Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, the Court utilized this analysis to 
 
 217 The Supreme Court first acknowledged that prison conditions could constitute a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment in its 1976 decision in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Dolovich, supra note 216, at 889. 
The Court has been hesitant, however, to deem that all conditions of confinement constitute punishment for 
Eighth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“The Eighth 
Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”). 
 218 Under the Court’s two-pronged test for conditions-of-confinement cases, a prisoner must objectively 
establish that he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), 
which in a failure-to-prevent-harm claim requires a showing from the prisoner that his conditions of 
confinement “pos[ed] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Second, the prisoner must 
show that prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference,” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, which requires a 
showing of the official’s actual knowledge of the risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official 
cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement 
unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both 
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference.”). 
 219 For example, the Court has held that certain means of administering the death penalty would violate 
the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, including burning on the stake, crucifixion, or breaking on 
the wheel. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890); Dolovich, supra note 216, at 884–85. 
 220 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 221 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103–04. 
 222 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981). 
 223 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832–34. 
 224 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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hold that certain punishments violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to 
juveniles under the age of eighteen.225  
1. Overview 
The Court has adopted a two-part analytical framework to assess whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual when applied to a certain category of 
offenders or to certain offenses.226 The Court first examines the “‘objective 
indicia of society’s standards . . . ’ to determine whether there is a national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”227 Then, “guided by ‘the 
standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own 
understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, 
meaning, and purpose,’” the Court determines if the punishment violates the 
Eighth Amendment through “the exercise of its own independent judgment.”228 
Thus far, the Court’s own understanding and interpretation, the second prong 
of the analysis, has not diverged from its assessment of national consensus.229 
Scholars have noted, however, that “[t]he possibility exists . . . that judicial 
judgment will someday diverge from public opinion concerning punishment 
for given crimes.”230 
The Court also considers the laws of other countries and international 
authorities in its Eighth Amendment categorical-rule analysis. Although the 
Court emphasizes that international norms are not dispositive in its decision 
making, the Court has considered them “instructive for its interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment[]”231 since its decision in Trop v. Dulles in 1958, in which 
the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited Congress from stripping 
a native-born American citizen of his citizenship after a criminal conviction.232 
In its consideration of international norms, the Court has lent particular 
credence to the laws of Great Britain233 and other Western European 
 
 225 The Court noted that the creation of categorical rules required line drawing, and it justified its selection 
of the age of eighteen as “the point where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and 
adulthood.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
 226 See, e.g., id. at 564. 
 227 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 563). 
 228 Id. (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 421). 
 229 William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment Evolving 
Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1380 (2005). 
 230 Id. at 1381. 
 231 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
 232 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 233 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (“The United Kingdom’s experience bears particular relevance here 
in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own origins.”). 
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countries.234 In addition to considering the uniformity of other countries’ laws 
involving certain punishments,235 the Court has considered the CRC236 and the 
decisions and statements of other international bodies in supporting its Eighth 
Amendment decisions.237 
2. Cruel and Unusual: The Death Penalty for Juveniles (Roper v. 
Simmons) 
In its decision in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court categorically 
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles who committed 
offenses while under the age of eighteen as an Eighth Amendment violation.238 
The Court concluded that juvenile offenders are “categorically less culpable” 
than adult offenders, and therefore, the imposition of the death penalty on 
juveniles is disproportionate to their offenses because of their decreased 
culpability as a class.239 The Roper Court situated its decision in the line of 
cases that categorically prohibited certain punishments as unconstitutional 
when applied to certain categories of offenders or to certain offenses. The 
Court compared its analysis, findings, and ultimate decision to its decision in 
Atkins v. Virginia,240 in which the Court held that the imposition of the death 
penalty on mentally retarded defendants constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.241 
The facts of Roper v. Simmons are disturbing. At the age of seventeen, 
Christopher Simmons planned and executed the murder of a woman by tying 
up her hands and feet with electrical wire, wrapping her face in duct tape, and 
throwing her off a bridge into a river, where she subsequently drowned.242 
 
 234 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion). In its decision in 
Thompson, the plurality looked particularly to “other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, 
and . . . leading members of the Western European community.” Id. 
 235 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (“[O]nly seven countries other than the United States have executed 
juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, and China.”). 
 236 See, e.g., id. at 576 (noting that the CRC condemns imposing capital punishment on juveniles under 
the age of eighteen). 
 237 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78; Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–18 n.21 (2002); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
796–97 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion); and Trop, 356 U.S. 
at 102–03). 
 238 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. 
 239 Id. at 561, 564–75 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 240 536 U.S. 304. 
 241 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–64 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–20). 
 242 Id. at 556–57. 
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Afterwards, Simmons bragged to his friends about his actions, and following 
his arrest, he confessed to the murder.243 Nine months later, Simmons was tried 
as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to death.244 
The Supreme Court noted that, even when a juvenile commits “a heinous 
crime,” such as the one committed by Christopher Simmons, “the State cannot 
extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own 
humanity.”245 The Court had previously held the death penalty to be an 
unconstitutional punishment for individuals who committed death-eligible 
offenses before the age of sixteen.246 In Roper, the Court extended its 
reasoning about culpability and proportionality to sixteen- and seventeen-year-
olds, even though the facts of the murder were particularly disturbing and 
Simmons was nearly eighteen at the time of the offense. 
In reaching its holding, the Court utilized the framework it adopted in its 
Eighth Amendment categorical-rule cases. First, the Court concluded that 
national consensus reflected a rejection of the death penalty for offenses 
committed prior to an individual’s eighteenth birthday.247 The Court focused 
on legislative enactments in the states, the actual imposition of the death 
penalty on juveniles, and the consistency in the trend toward abolishing the 
practice.248 The Court found that juveniles were excluded from receiving the 
death penalty in eighteen of the states that permitted the death penalty, either 
through “express provision or judicial interpretation.”249 To reach the 
conclusion that “[a] majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death 
penalty on juvenile offenders,” the Court also added the twelve states that had 
abolished the death penalty entirely to the eighteen states that specifically 
prohibited its imposition on juveniles.250 The Court concluded that society 
viewed juveniles as “categorically less culpable than the average criminal.”251 
The Court then exercised its independent judicial judgment and reasoned 
that the death penalty should not be applied to juvenile offenders.252 In this 
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 246 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (plurality opinion). 
 247 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 248 Id. at 567. 
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analysis, the Court adopted a notable view of adolescent development. The 
Court described three general differences between juveniles and adults, and it 
characterized these differences as “marked and well understood.”253 First, the 
Court noted that “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults” and that “[t]hese 
qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”254 
The Court pointed to laws in almost every state that prohibit children under the 
age of eighteen from voting, serving on juries, or getting married without 
parental consent as evidence of the states’ recognition of this immaturity and 
lack of responsibility.255 The Court further stated that “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, 
including peer pressure.”256 Finally, the Court asserted, “[T]he character of a 
juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of 
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”257 The Court also opined, “[N]either 
retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the 
death penalty on juvenile offenders.”258 
Although the Court noted that international norms were not controlling, it 
devoted an entire section of its opinion to a consideration of these norms as 
related to the juvenile death penalty.259 The Court specifically discussed the 
CRC’s rejection of capital punishment for juveniles, even though the United 
States has not ratified the treaty.260 The Court also lent particular weight to 
Great Britain’s prohibition of the juvenile death penalty “in light of the historic 
ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment’s own 
origins.”261 
The Court ultimately concluded that juveniles cannot be considered among 
the worst offenders and that acts committed by a juvenile are less morally 
reprehensible than those committed by an adult.262 The Court ruled that the 
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment as applied to juveniles as a class, 
 
 253 Id. at 572. 
 254 Id. at 569 (first alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. at 570. 
 258 Id. at 572. 
 259 Id. at 575–78. 
 260 See id. at 576. 
 261 Id. at 577. 
 262 Id. at 570. 
WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
2012] CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 1479 
even though the punishment remained constitutional as applied to adults. Five 
years later, the Court expanded its Eighth Amendment categorical-rule analysis 
to deem a noncapital punishment unconstitutional when applied to a broad 
category of juvenile offenders. 
3. Cruel and Unusual: Life-Without-the-Possibility-of-Parole Sentences for 
Juveniles Convicted of Nonhomicide Offenses (Graham v. Florida) 
In May 2010, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, in which it 
prohibited a category of offenders, juveniles, from receiving a certain 
punishment, life in prison without the possibility of parole, for nonhomicide 
offenses.263 Noting that it was forging a new path, the Court situated the case 
in the line of categorical-rule cases that had previously only involved the death 
penalty.264 The Graham Court adopted the two-part analytical framework 
utilized in these cases to reach its holding that a specific term-of-years 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment when applied to a juvenile convicted 
of a nonhomicide offense.265 
At the age of sixteen, Terrance Jamar Graham pled guilty to armed 
burglary and attempted armed robbery, after he and three accomplices 
attempted to rob a restaurant.266 No money was taken, but one of Graham’s 
accomplices hit the manager twice in the back of the head with a metal bar, for 
which the manager received stitches.267 The judge accepted Graham’s guilty 
plea, withheld adjudication, and sentenced Graham to concurrent three-year 
terms of probation, the first twelve months of which Graham was supposed to 
spend in a county jail.268 Six months after being released, Graham was arrested 
for an armed home invasion.269 The trial court found Graham guilty of the 
earlier armed burglary and attempted armed robbery charges and sentenced 
him to life imprisonment plus fifteen years.270 Because Florida had abolished 
its parole system, this life sentence effectively resulted in a sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.271 
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WOOD GALLEYS3 8/24/2012  1:36 PM 
1480 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1445 
The Court noted that Graham’s case “involve[d] an issue the Court ha[d] 
not considered previously.”272 The Court characterized the case, however, as 
one “implicat[ing] a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class 
of offenders who have committed a range of crimes.”273 Therefore, the Court 
rejected a threshold comparison between the severity of the penalty and the 
gravity of the crime and adopted the method of analysis used in cases adopting 
a categorical approach, including Atkins v. Virginia, Roper v. Simmons, and 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which it considered the national consensus on the 
punishment and then utilized independent judicial discretion in assessing 
whether the punishment is cruel and unusual.274 
The Graham Court first considered the objective indicia of national 
consensus.275 The Court concluded that a national consensus had developed 
that juveniles should not be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole for nonhomicide offenses, even though the federal government and 
thirty-seven of fifty states permitted that punishment.276 The Court found 
national consensus by looking to actual sentencing practices, and it noted that 
only twelve jurisdictions actually sentenced juvenile offenders convicted of 
nonhomicide crimes to life in prison without the possibility of parole.277 The 
Court reasoned that those states with laws that allowed for sentences of life in 
prison without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders but rarely imposed 
such sentences merely failed to distinguish between juveniles and adults in 
their laws.278 At the time of the decision, 109 juveniles were serving such 
sentences across the country.279 Unlike Atkins and Roper, in which the Court 
considered jury-imposed capital punishment, the Graham Court’s finding of 
national consensus rested on its consideration of “a modus operandi among 
expert officials, including sentencing commissioners, prosecutors, and 
judges.”280 
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 276 See id. at 2049 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The additional reality that 37 out of 50 States (a 
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Although the Court determined that consensus existed, it noted that 
“[c]ommunity consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself 
determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.”281 The Court 
then moved to the second prong of its analysis, in which it exercised its 
independent judicial judgment, which “require[d] consideration of the 
culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and 
characteristics.”282 Some scholars suggest that the Graham Court “appears to 
have been motivated primarily by its independent judgment analysis.”283 
In its exercise of judicial judgment, the Court repeatedly cited Roper and 
emphasized the many differences between juveniles and adults. The Graham 
Court characterized a key concept in Roper as being “that because juveniles 
have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.”284 The Court restated and affirmed its conclusions about 
adolescent development and culpability from Roper: “No recent data provide 
reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of 
juveniles.”285 The Court further stated that “developments in psychology and 
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and 
adult minds.”286 The Court noted that a juvenile “should not be deprived of the 
opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of human 
worth and potential.”287 
The Court also considered the penological justifications for sentencing a 
juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court noted that 
“[a] sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature 
disproportionate to the offense.”288 The Court concluded that none of the 
legitimate penological justifications, including retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, provided an “adequate” justification for the 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide 
juvenile offenders.289 In its discussion of rehabilitation, the Court stated that 
juvenile offenders are “most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation” and that 
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“the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the 
disproportionality of the sentence all the more evident.”290 
Like in Roper, the Graham Court devoted an entire section to a 
consideration of international norms surrounding the sentencing practice in 
question.291 Although the Court emphasized that the decisions of other 
countries “are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment,” it 
stressed the relevance of international consensus against the sentencing 
practice being considered.292 The Court found only eleven countries that 
allowed for the possibility of life in prison without parole for juvenile 
offenders and that only the United States and Israel actually imposed the 
punishment.293 The Court also took note of the values espoused in the CRC, 
which forbids life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juvenile 
offenders.294 
In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court utilized a two-part analytical 
framework to determine that certain punishments violate the Eighth 
Amendment as applied to juveniles. In both decisions, the Court relied heavily 
on scientific and psychological evidence that demonstrates the fundamental 
differences between juveniles and adults. The Court deemed juveniles 
categorically less culpable and held that certain punishments were 
unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders. 
C. Relying on Categorical-Rule Cases to Hold Mandatory Life-Without-
Parole Sentencing Schemes Unconstitutional for Juveniles (Miller v. 
Alabama) 
In June 2012, the Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama,295 in which it 
held that mandatory life-without-parole sentencing schemes violate the Eighth 
Amendment when applied to juveniles.296 Although the Court did not opt to 
use its two-part analytical framework and decide the case by adopting a 
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 295 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
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categorical ban, its decision heavily drew upon the analysis and fundamental 
principles in its categorical-rule cases, especially Roper and Graham.297 In 
fact, the Miller Court declared that the majority’s reasoning in Graham served 
as “the foundation stone of [its] analysis.”298 The Court’s decision ultimately 
rested on this line of categorical-rule cases and another line of precedent in 
which the Court required individualized sentencing for defendants facing the 
death penalty.299 
In assessing its categorical-rule cases, the Miller Court focused on those 
cases involving juvenile offenders. Throughout its opinion, the Court 
repeatedly referenced Roper and Graham and emphasized the reasoning in 
those cases, especially as it pertained to the distinctive characteristics of 
juveniles. In fact, the Court concluded that the science and social science that 
supported its decisions in Roper and Graham had become stronger since it 
reached those decisions.300 The Court reiterated many of its previous 
conclusions regarding juvenile development, including juveniles’ capacity for 
positive change and decreased culpability.301 The Court’s assessment that 
Roper and Graham established that “children are constitutionally different 
from adults for purposes of sentencing” appeared to be at the heart of its 
reasoning.302 
The Court also explicitly separated its prior decisions that contemplated 
juveniles from those decisions that did not.303 The Court seemed to suggest that 
any prior decisions that did not specifically contemplate juveniles would not 
necessarily apply to them.304 In responding to arguments that its holding in 
Harmelin v. Michigan305 precluded its holding in Miller, the Court asserted that 
“Harmelin had nothing to do with children and did not purport to apply its 
holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.”306 The Court stressed that it 
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possibility of parole for possession of 650 grams of cocaine, the Harmelin Court concluded that “a sentence 
which is not otherwise cruel and unusual [does not] become[] so simply because it is ‘mandatory.’” Id. at 995. 
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had “now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for 
adults may not be so for children.”307 
The Court refused to limit its reasoning in Roper or Graham regarding the 
specific characteristics of juveniles to particular crimes: “[N]one of what [the 
Court] said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental 
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”308 The Court 
stressed that youth “is a moment and ‘condition of life when a person may be 
most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.’”309 
In its analysis, the Court also emphasized the importance of assessing 
whether the imposition of a particular punishment on a juvenile fulfills any 
purpose of punishment.310 The Court considered retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation in turn and concluded that none supported 
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.311 The Court again emphasized the 
importance of the possibility of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders in light of 
children’s “capacity for change.”312 The Court used the stated differences 
between juveniles and adults to stress that juveniles “are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.”313 The Court summarized much of its reasoning by 
concluding: “Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes 
consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.”314 
Although not necessary to the Court’s analysis, as it would have been if the 
Court had adopted a categorical rule, the Miller Court considered the states’ 
legislative enactments regarding life-without-parole sentencing schemes.315 At 
the time Miller was decided, twenty-eight states and the federal government 
permitted at least some juveniles to be sentenced to mandatory life without 
parole.316 The Court concluded that these numbers constituted a weaker case 
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than the numbers presented in Graham, where the Court “prohibited life-
without-parole terms for juveniles committing nonhomicide offenses even 
though 39 jurisdictions permitted that sentence.”317 The Court also pointed to 
the categorical-rule decisions involving capital punishment, including Atkins, 
Roper, and Thompson, in which it categorically prohibited the death penalty in 
situations where less than 50% of the states that allowed capital punishment 
did so.318 In addition, the Court noted that it was “impossible to say whether a 
legislature had endorsed a given penalty for children (or would do so if 
presented with the choice)” when the application of at least two entirely 
different statutory provisions resulted in the sentencing practice in question.319 
The Court left the door open to a future decision that might adopt a 
categorical rule banning life-without-parole sentences for juveniles. The Court 
noted that it did not even “consider . . . [the] alternative argument that the 
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar on life without parole for 
juveniles,” because the mandatory sentencing schemes before the Court 
disregarded “youth (and all that accompanies it) . . . [, which] poses too great a 
risk of disproportionate punishment.”320 The Court’s decision in Miller 
reaffirms the Court’s commitment to considering a defendant’s youth and the 
purposes of punishment in determining the constitutionality of sentencing 
schemes as applied to juveniles. In short, the Court’s decision in Miller 
emphasizes that youth matters in sentencing. 
IV.  CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: CONFINING JUVENILES WITH ADULTS 
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment categorical-rule cases provide an 
analytical framework for assessing the constitutionality of the confinement of 
juveniles with adults, which implicates “a particular type of sentence as it 
applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of 
crimes.”321 When assessing whether the confinement of juveniles with adults 
violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court should adopt the method of analysis 
used in these categorical-rule cases, because its decision would require 
determining the constitutionality of the application of a certain punishment—
confinement with adults—on a certain category of offenders—juveniles. The 
Court’s 2010 decision in Graham opens the door to the use of this analytical 
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framework in the consideration of punishments other than the death penalty. 
Like in Graham, the Court’s evaluation of confinement with adults would 
evaluate the practices of expert officials and sentencing commissioners, rather 
than jury decisions. The Court’s reasoning in Miller further supports that youth 
and its associated characteristics are critical to evaluating the constitutionality 
of sentencing schemes as applied to juveniles. 
Under the analytical framework utilized in the Court’s categorical-rule 
cases, which takes into consideration the fact that a maturing society has 
evolving standards of decency,322 the Court would first consider the objective 
indicia of national consensus.323 An evaluation of the objective indicia of 
consensus indicates that states are moving away from confining juveniles with 
adults. 
The number of juveniles being held in prisons and jails nationally has 
declined since 2000. On the annual one-day count of prison inmates in 2000, 
3896 juveniles were incarcerated in state prisons throughout the United 
States.324 On the day of the 2009 count, the number of juveniles incarcerated in 
state prisons had decreased to 2778.325 In 2000, 7615 juveniles were held in 
jails throughout the country on the annual one-day count of jail inmate 
populations.326 On the annual one-day count in 2011, the number of juveniles 
being held in adult jails had declined to 5900.327 Those states that currently 
house higher numbers of juveniles in adult facilities, such as Pennsylvania,328 
have recently started taking steps to decrease the juvenile population in their 
adult facilities. Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1169, signed into law in October of 
2010, permits a juvenile being tried in the adult criminal system to be “de-
certified” and held in a juvenile facility.329 
In determining whether a majority of states reject the confinement of 
juveniles with adults, the Court should evaluate the number of states that 
prohibit confining juveniles and adults in the same facility along with the 
number of states that require sight-and-sound separation between all juvenile 
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and adult inmates confined in the same facility.330 In 2009, seven states did not 
house any juveniles in adult prisons,331 twelve states housed ten or fewer 
juveniles in adult prisons,332 and ten states housed fewer than twenty-five 
juveniles in adult prisons.333 Among the states that continue to confine 
juveniles in adult facilities, some require sight-and-sound separation between 
the juveniles and adults.334 Of the thirty-nine states that allow juveniles to be 
held in adult jails while awaiting trial in criminal court, twenty require that 
juveniles be separated from adults during this period.335 National consensus 
against confining juveniles with adults in prisons and jails continues to grow, 
and a majority of states now appear to reject this punishment. 
After its consideration of the national consensus, the Court would then 
move to the next step in the categorical-rule analysis and exercise independent 
judicial discretion to assess whether confining juveniles alongside adults 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.336 Juveniles face significant dangers 
to their safety and well-being, including alarmingly high rates of physical 
abuse, sexual assault, and suicide, when confined with adults in jails and 
prisons.337 The many physical, developmental, and psychological differences 
between juveniles and adults, already recognized by the Supreme Court in 
numerous decisions, make incarceration with adults an unconstitutional 
punishment for children under the age of eighteen.338 Adult facilities are 
generally not equipped to handle the special developmental needs of juveniles, 
 
 330 Further research is necessary to determine the nature of the state laws that govern the confinement of 
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including those related to their physical, emotional, and educational well-
being.339 
Any legitimate penological goals of confining juveniles with adults do not 
adequately justify the punishment. Confinement with adults may actually 
increase recidivism for juveniles, and evidence of any general deterrence is 
lacking.340 The Supreme Court’s statements in Graham, that juvenile offenders 
“are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation” and that “the absence of 
rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the 
sentence all the more evident,” are particularly relevant when examining the 
confinement of juveniles with adults, given the stark differences between adult 
and juvenile facilities.341  
An examination of international norms supports the conclusion that the 
confinement of juveniles with adults constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment.342 The CRC, the standards of which the Supreme Court 
considered in Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, discourages the 
incarceration of children343 and notes the critical importance of separating 
juveniles from adults during any periods of confinement that do occur.344 
Article 37(c) of the CRC states, “[E]very child deprived of liberty shall be 
separated from adults unless it is considered in the child’s best interest not to 
do so.”345 European countries, including Great Britain and Sweden, do not 
incarcerate children under the age of eighteen with adults.346 Other countries, 
including South Africa and New Zealand, also prohibit the confinement of 
juveniles with adults under any circumstances.347 Based on the weight of the 
scientific evidence and international sources of law, two factors the Court has 
relied upon in past cases to formulate its own independent judgment on a 
punishment, the Court is likely to find that confining juveniles with adults 
violates the Eighth Amendment under the second prong of its analysis. 
Using the analytical framework laid out in its Eighth Amendment 
categorical-rule cases, including Roper and Graham, and the fundamental 
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principles laid out in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court 
should hold that incarcerating juveniles with adults violates the Eighth 
Amendment. To correct the constitutional violations that occur upon 
incarcerating juveniles with adults and remedy the dangers inherent in such an 
arrangement, children under the age of eighteen should be confined only in 
facilities designated exclusively for juveniles, regardless of whether their cases 
are heard in juvenile or criminal court.348 
States may deal with the confinement of youthful offenders in a variety of 
ways. Some jurisdictions have adopted a form of blended sentencing that 
allows a juvenile adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court to continue his 
sentence even after aging out of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.349 In some 
states, juveniles who are convicted in criminal court serve their sentences in 
juvenile facilities until the age of eighteen, at which time a hearing is held to 
determine their optimal placement, which may continue to be the juvenile 
facility or may be an adult facility.350 
When a separate juvenile facility is not available for a juvenile that must be 
confined, juveniles placed in adult facilities must be separated from adult 
inmates, such that adults and juveniles can neither see nor hear one another.351 
If a state does not currently have space to adequately house juveniles in 
facilities designated solely for them, a state must ensure that juveniles remain 
completely separated from the adult population. This option, however, is not 
ideal and may result in many negative outcomes for juveniles.352 
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with the criminal justice system’s focus on criminal sanctions. Id. at 146. Blended sentencing may “provide[] a 
solution to the correctional programming problem of an influx of juveniles into adult correctional systems ill 
equipped to handle their special needs.” Id. at 147. 
 350 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 24. 
 351 The JJDPA requires sight-and-sound separation for all juveniles with cases pending or adjudicated in 
juvenile court. See supra Part II.B. 
 352 CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4, 7. Juveniles in adult facilities may be housed in 
isolation, without any meaningful human contact, which can have devastating psychological and emotional 
consequences. Id. at 4. Juveniles in isolation also may not be able to take advantage of even the limited 
programming offered in an adult facility. Id. at 7; see also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 13, at 258. 
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CONCLUSION 
Confining juveniles with adults violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Juveniles, recognized by the 
Supreme Court as being developmentally different from adults and having 
diminished culpability, face grave dangers when confined with adults in 
prisons and jails. In Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. 
Alabama, the Court expounded upon the many differences between juveniles 
and adults. In Roper and Graham, the Court held that juveniles’ diminished 
culpability as a class warranted the establishment of bright-line rules against 
capital punishment and life in prison without the possibility of parole for the 
nonhomicide conviction of a juvenile, respectively. Similarly, juveniles’ 
diminished culpability, along with the unfulfilled penological goal of 
deterrence, merits a bright-line rule preventing the confinement of juveniles 
with adults in prisons and jails. Given the significant and known dangers faced 
by juveniles confined in adult facilities, the confinement of juveniles with 
adults violates the Eighth Amendment. 
Although this Comment does not argue for the elimination of the transfer 
of juveniles to criminal court, it does assert that even when juveniles are tried 
in criminal court, the Constitution prohibits the confinement of juveniles with 
adults. Although sight-and-sound separation from adults in prisons and jails 
would be less likely to violate the Eighth Amendment, it is not an ideal 
solution and still presents significant risks, especially stemming from the 
dangers of solitary confinement for juveniles.353 
Accordingly, whenever possible, juveniles should be housed in juvenile 
facilities at least until they reach the age of eighteen. States should begin to 
prepare for increased numbers of juveniles that will need to be confined in 
juvenile facilities if the Supreme Court holds the confinement of juveniles with 
adults to be unconstitutional. The ultimate solution, however, will be for states 




 353 See CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 4. 
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detention and correctional facilities, and that promote nonresidential 




 354 Such nonresidential options might include evidence-based family-intervention models, such as 
multisystemic therapy or functional family therapy; career preparation and vocational training programs, such 
as YouthBuild; mentoring programs; cognitive-behavioral-skills trainings; or focused mental health and 
substance-abuse-treatment programs. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., NO PLACE FOR 
KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 16–19, 30 (2011), available at http://www. 
aecf.org/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile%20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JJ_NoPlaceForKids
_Full.pdf. 
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